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Mark Donoghue*
John Stuart Mill: Victorian Firebrand opens in St James Park, on a warm summer’s
morning, with the teenage Mill striding to his office in Leadenhall Street in the
financial heart of the City of London. Suddenly, Mill’s attention is caught by a small
bundle abandoned beneath an oak tree. Curious, Mill kneels down beside it and
unwraps the layers of soiled blankets only to discover a dead, newborn baby. This
grisly experience remained etched in Mill’s mind for the duration of his life and was
perhaps formative in shaping his views on the twin rights of life and liberty.
Britain then stood poised in the vanguard of economic industrialisation and
opportunity, yet the lot of the working classes often remained quite harsh. With
grinding poverty being the accepted norm for so many ordinary Britons, it was not
uncommon for poor families, unable to fend for themselves, to abandon their
children. The whole incident had so moved Mill that he decided to take it upon
himself to bring about social change. Along with a friend, he toured the East End of
London distributing pamphlets informing working class people about
contraception, birth control and family planning issues. He was soon arrested for
the circulation of obscene materials and duly appeared before a Bow Street
Magistrate. Mill spent a couple of days behind bars, the only occasion in his life
where he was deprived of his personal freedom. His immediate family and close
friends fretted about the possible damage the arrest might cause to his future
reputation. Many years later this ‘Bow Street’ incident induced William Gladstone
to refuse to participate in a memorial for Mill. The possibility of such social snubs,
posthumously or otherwise, was of no concern to Mill. He took the whole episode
in his stride. From an early stage, Mill’s ‘resolute purpose’ (2007, p. 3) had been
the pursuit of those advanced liberal causes that he believed were worth fighting
for, irrespective of any possible damage to his personal reputation. He remained, as
John Morley (1917, 1, p. 55) once put it, ‘a man of extreme sensibility and vital
heat in things worth waxing hot about’.
Mill refused to sit back and play the role of detached philosopher and
intellectual observer. He wished for his ideas and opinions actively to shape and
improve the lot of those in all levels of society. The strength of this lively and
illuminating new biography by Richard Reeves lies in the discussion of the central
animating theme of Mill’s life and work: individual liberty. At the core of Mill’s
liberalism was a ‘clearly and repeatedly articulated vision of a flourishing human
life―self-improving, passionate, truth-seeking, engaged and colourful―which it
was the job of individuals to cultivate, and the duty of society to promote’ (2007,
p. 6). Mill’s liberalism, then, formed a dramatic arc around every dimension of his
life; its stated aim was to create, nurture and perpetuate a liberal culture founded on
personal freedom, independent character, individual duty and self cultivation. This
approach invariably led him to champion particular (usually unpopular) causes
which attracted a good deal of acerbic comment from the political establishment of
the day. Undeterred, Mill kept tackling those issues he deemed most pressing to
society, not uncommonly adopting an uncompromising posture, with often
disastrous personal repercussions. Mill gradually earned a reputation as an ardent
partisan and accomplished polemicist, supporting a host of ‘advanced liberal
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causes’ throughout his life, often drawing widespread opprobrium for his perversity
and recklessness. (The satirical magazine, Punch, had a field day poking fun at
Mill’s crochets.) Again, Mill never demurred in the face of hostile voices. In fact,
the role of the self-styled outsider was one he relished. If the cause was morally
good, improved people’s lives and thus enriched society, Mill would support it with
all the intellectual muscularity and personal passion that he could muster. His
doggedness often bordered on obstinacy.
In the Scottish lexicon, there is an expression, thrawn, which refers to such
obstinate and perverse behaviour. Richard Reeves explains that Mill’s increasingly
partisan activities often manifested themselves in perverse and unexpected ways,
mostly in an obdurate refusal to be satisfied with the status quo and occasionally by
reversing positions he had previously steadfastly held. Take, for instance, Mill’s
stance on the secret ballot. During the 1830s, he vehemently supported the secret
ballot because he believed that voters needed protection from the coercion, bribery
and intimidation levelled by the landed aristocratic interest that then dominated the
British political landscape. By the 1850s, however, Mill no longer supported the
secret ballot. He then felt that Britain had, in the intervening period, matured
politically. Thus, voters should be able to express their political opinions freely in
public. Such idealism, though entirely consistent with Mill’s own projection of a
liberal culture, diluted his standing among leading liberal and radical figures mainly
because the secret ballot was a keystone in their electoral reform agenda. During
his mature years, Mill also increasingly found himself aligned with the Tories on
such issues as capital punishment and national service. There was in fact a range of
public policy issues on which Mill displayed outwardly ‘conservative’ credentials,
which sometimes put him offside with the liberal-cum-radical interest. It is fair to
say that Mill never completely jettisoned the conservative influences he imbibed
during his years of immersing himself in poetic culture. The retention of
conservative strands in some of Mill’s later work has attracted criticism from
modern scholars (see, for example, Gertrude Himmelfarb 1974) who have argued
that the residual conservative strains in his mature thought undermine the central
unifying theme running through On Liberty: the idea of human progress within a
liberal society. However, it is important to be aware, as Reeves reminds the reader,
that Mill rarely composed a work merely for the sake of philosophical precision
(2007, p. 119). When he put forward an analytical proposition or policy proposal,
Mill always kept in mind the need to ground an argument in the principles
underpinning the liberal culture that he so cherished. Inevitably, this sometimes
involved sacrificing philosophical exactness for the ultimate goal of promoting and
defending the central tenets of a liberal society.
Another facet of Mill’s thought that has attracted both praise and derision
is his shifting position on the role of government in the economy. Richard Reeves
argues that Mill ‘was vehemently opposed to centralized state control of the
economy’ (2007, p. 7). This judgment is entirely correct despite the fact that the
Principles of Political Economy is littered with examples of government
interventions that Mill endorsed. During the third quarter of the nineteenth century,
a considerable amount of interest was generated by controversial issues such as
women’s suffrage and Irish land reform. These two iconic topics in the Mill canon
have both been handled by Reeves in a careful and judicious manner. Mill actively
supported government involvement in both cases, largely because the status quo
was seen by Mill as inimical to the creation of the liberal society he envisaged. The
primary obstacle in each case was outmoded customs and prejudices that
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constituted a threat to individual freedom. If the instruments of the State could be
mobilised to remove such impediments, then Mill had no qualms about sanctioning
their use. There were, however, notable instances where the State had failed to
secure the livelihoods and protect the interests of the most vulnerable members of
society. Reeves, for example, dwells briefly on Mill’s attitude to the Whig reforms
of Lord Cornwallis in the Bengal Presidency during the late eighteenth century.
Prior to British rule, the land tenure of small-scale farmers had largely been secure
under a system of traditional property rights. Under the Cornwallis reforms,
however, the economic position of small-scale tenant farmers in eastern India
deteriorated markedly. They were stripped of their property rights by a new class of
large-scale landholders known as Zamindars created by the British colonial
administration. The motive of course was economic. The resemblance between the
Zamindars and British landed aristocracy was not lost on Mill. Mill, an ardent
supporter of peasant proprietorship in Ireland, lamented these State-led changes to
land ownership on the sub-Continent; this despite his long-standing involvement
(as senior East India Company mandarin) in the cause of empire. Mill’s assessment
of the situation was that the land tenure arrangements that had been in place in
India before British rule were far superior to the Cornwallis reforms. Indeed, Mill
believed that India and Ireland suffered from the common fate of being ruled and
exploited by a colonial power whose priority was still to protect the economic
interests of the metropolitan nation. Mill was in fact a staunch advocate of
appropriating to Ireland the paradigm of peasant proprietorship which had prevailed
in India during pre-colonial times, yet another tantalising example of the extent to
which the pre-colonial experience in India could be harnessed in remaking the postcolonial situation in Ireland. Sadly, Mill’s increasingly strident position on Irish
land tenure reform marginalised the issue in Britain until several years after his
death in 1873. It is nevertheless apparent that his views on land ownership in
general and the Irish land system in particular relied heavily on his Indian
experience, which suggests that the dismissive claim in the Autobiography that his
35 years of imperial service were insignificant to his intellectual development
stands in need of some refinement. Mill scholars still await an exhaustive treatment
of his India House activities, which remain largely shrouded in mystery.
Another key public policy issue of the day on which Mill expressed
himself passionately, and which Reeves dwells upon, was education. He believed
that government should take the lead in making a basic education available to all
children. As with the recommendation to extend the political franchise to all adults
(subject to appropriate checks to safeguard against the ‘tyranny of public opinion’),
Mill wanted people to be better educated as this would enable them to lead better
lives, which would assist in promoting a healthy, vibrant and tolerant liberal society
(2007, pp. 115, 268). His concerns were driven, perhaps unsurprisingly, by his own
mode of private education. Yet, at the same time, he feared the stultifying
consequences of a comprehensive public education system that tended to produce
social constructs rather than individuals capable of expressing unorthodox and
‘dissentient opinions’. ‘A general State education’, Mill declared, ‘is a mere
contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another’ (2007, p. 289). He
continued: ‘All that has been said of the importance of individuality of character, and
diversity in opinions and modes of conduct, involves, as of the same unspeakable
importance, diversity of education’ (ibid.). For Mill, the existence of heterodox
(especially minority) opinions in society was paramount because the collision of
opposing views was the crucible in which the truth was to be formed. ‘Eccentricity
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has always abounded when and where strength of character has abounded’, wrote
Mill, ‘and the amount of eccentricity in a society has generally been proportional to
the amount of genius, mental vigour, and moral courage which it contained. That so
few dare to be eccentric marks the chief danger of the time’ (2007, p. 295).
Mill’s concern over the stifling effects of universal education also moulded
his deep-seated suspicion of both democracy and socialism. Although he saw merit
in both political systems, he felt that neither was capable of sustaining ‘the greatest
amount of human liberty and spontaneity’ (2007, p. 227). Although Mill wanted to
build cohesive democratic institutions and cultivate the idea of civic pride and
citizen responsibility, the diverse make-up of society should not be compromised
along the way. A vital component in securing these social goals was the extension
of the political franchise. This, he hoped, would ensure that a larger number of
individuals had a greater stake in their own future. As one of Britain’s foremost
public moralists, Mill agitated tirelessly to extend working class representation, all
the while taking great pains to reign in working class domination, which he
variously described as ‘mere mob-government’ or a ‘despotism of the numerical
majority’ (2007, p. 311). The motive remained, as before, to ensure a ‘fair
representation of minorities’ (2007, p. 311). In Mill’s opinion the solution lay in
requiring all voters to meet a minimum educational qualification. (Mill also
recommended that MPs be required to meet a minimum level of education. The
obvious wisdom underlying this conclusion has alas been lost to future
generations.) During the late 1850s and early 1860s, Mill invested more time and
energy casting around for mechanisms to staunch the flow of the ‘majoritarian tide’
(2007, p. 314), finally settling on Thomas Hare’s proposal for proportional
representation, a scheme that he described as ‘the greatest discovery on
representative government’ (2007, p. 311). Until his death in 1873, Mill remained
convinced that Hare’s plan provided the answer to all the problems of modern
democracy, but its practical import was less obvious to other political observers. It
was not and has never been implemented.
Reeves also makes clear that, even with Mill’s personal crochets in Ireland,
women’s suffrage and proportional representation and so on, Mill never wavered in
his general commitment to liberty within the common domain, especially in his
later years. There are, of course, several passages in the Principles of Political
Economy that appear to suggest that Mill was receptive to socialism and
communism. Mill’s interest in comparative economic systems stemmed from an
enthusiasm for cooperation in economic activities and the corresponding mutual
benefits that would flow to both capital and labour in the form of higher profits and
wages. It is indeed the case that Mill considered socialism a clear step forward
compared to the then class-based hierarchy of British society. For some advocates
of socialism, this is sufficient evidence to argue that Mill, under the influence of the
redoubtable Harriet, was a fellow traveller. This view is both naïve and factually
dubious. For Mill, the appropriate comparison lay between socialism and a
reformed market economy. ‘To make the comparison applicable’, Mill opined, ‘we
must compare Communism at its best, with the régime of individual property, not
as it is, but as it might be made. The principle of private property has never yet had
a fair trial in any country; and less so, perhaps, in this country than in some others’
(2007, p. 225). Mill, having carefully weighed up the costs and benefits of
competing economic systems, arrived at a benchmark that was meant to facilitate a
sensible judgment. ‘The decision’, Mill said, ‘will probably depend mainly on one
decision, viz. which of the two systems is consistent with the greatest amount of
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human liberty and spontaneity’ (2007, p. 227). Mill’s concerns about socialism and
communism arose from his liberalism: the need to foster individual freedom
remained paramount. As Mill wrote:
No society in which eccentricity is a matter of reproach, can be
in a wholesome state … It is yet to be ascertained whether the
Communistic scheme would be consistent with that multiform
development of human nature, those manifold unlikenesses,
that diversity of tastes and talents, and variety of intellectual
points of view, which not only form a great part of the interest
of human life, but by bringing intellects into stimulating
collision, and by presenting to each innumerable notions that he
would not have conceived of himself, are the mainspring of
mental and moral progression. (2007, p. 227)
Mill remained, as Reeves has convincingly shown, ‘a liberal, a democrat and a
socialist ―in that order’ (2007, p. 7).
Reeves’ careful reading of Mill’s position on liberty in the wider market
place is matched by his judgments on Mill’s mental and emotional constitution, a
constitution that has been the subject of considerable scholarly diagnosis over many
years. Indeed, one of the positive outcomes of Reeves’ biography lies in his attempt
to challenge several caricatures that have, over time, coalesced around public
opinion concerning Mill’s emotional and intellectual development. Three examples
are considered here. The first concerns the role of James Mill in the ‘unusual and
remarkable’ education of his son, once described by the twentieth-century
philosopher, Isaiah Berlin, as ‘an appalling success’ (2007, p. 12). Looked at this
way, James Mill is normally vilified for the harsh educational regimen that he
imposed on all his children. This view has often been rehearsed by Mill scholars
and biographers whose conclusions remain coloured by modern educational
expectations and standards. Reeves provides a more nuanced and even-handed
assessment that focuses on Mill’s own characteristically balanced evaluation of his
education as an essential foundation for his later success. ‘If I have achieved
anything, I owe it’, Mill opined, ‘to the fact that through the early training bestowed
on me by my father, I started, I may fairly say, with an advantage of a quarter of a
century over my contemporaries’ (2007, p. 26). In Reeves’ account, James Mill
emerges in a softer autumnal light as someone concerned about the welfare of his
progeny and not entirely devoid of parental feeling.
The second matter canvassed by Reeves relates to Mill’s prowess as an
orator (2007, p. 46). In contrast to the classical orators that he studied, Mill never
went on to become a great public speaker. His forte remained the written word. It
has been well documented that he possessed a thin voice. His maiden speech to the
House of Commons following his electoral victory in the seat of Westminster in the
1865 General Election was described, even by his closest admirers, as a resounding
failure. Yet, as an MP in the 1860s, his oratory skills gradually improved. He began
to revel in the House of Commons banter with the Tory opposition, subjecting the
lawyers William Shee and Abraham Hayward to a barrage of droll put-downs,
while leaving his own benches clutching their sides in mirth. When asked for
example to withdraw a remark about the Tories being ‘the stupidest party’, Mill
offered the following apology, as recorded in Hansard: ‘I did not mean that
Conservatives are generally stupid; I meant, that stupid people are generally
Conservative. (Laughter and cheers.) And I do not see why the honourable
gentlemen should feel that position at all offensive to them; for it ensures their
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always being an extremely powerful party. (Hear hear.)’ (pp. 374-5) (The Tories
struck back, of course, with their own well-orchestrated campaign intended to
discredit those issues with which Mill was associated.)
A third issue turns on Isaiah Berlin’s remark that Mill was renowned for
his ‘total lack of humour’ (2007, p. 248). Reeves persuasively argues, however, that
the image that normally attaches to Mill in the literature as someone who was an
austere, analytical, ‘black-coated Victorian prude’ (2007, p. 262) is neither fair nor
accurate. In fact, contrary to received wisdom, Mill possessed a light-hearted side
and a droll sense of humour. His published and unpublished writings are punctuated
with playful metaphors, amusing anecdotes and clever retorts. Thus: ‘If to have
been to University be the end of education there is no doubt that by going to
University that end may be most effectually attained’ (2007, p. 46); ‘I cannot
bestow upon Bulwer’s article any milder name than despicable … God grant that
nobody may read it, or that whoever does, will instantaneously forget every word of
it’ (2007, p. 141); and, when asked in the House to reconcile his views on limiting
the size of working class families with the ‘Scriptural injunction, that we are to
increase and multiply’, Mill replied, ‘It says we are to eat and drink, but not overeat and over-drink ourselves. (Cheers and laughter.)’ (2007, p. 364). Reeves here
reveals that Mill himself was fully aware of the importance of possessing a natural
sense of humour: it is ‘a great defect in a character’, Mill thought, ‘to be without
lightness … A certain infusion of the laughing philosopher … is a prodigious help
towards bearing the evils of life, and I should think has saved many a person from
going mad’ (2007, p. 249).
Another facet of Mill’s portraiture that Reeves thoughtfully re-examines is
whether Mill was a ‘Taylor-made man’ (Lipkes 1999, p. 76), a reference to Harriet
Taylor’s ‘almost hypnotic control of Mill’s mind’ (Packe 1954, p. 315). Of course
Mill himself went to great lengths in the Autobiography to emphasise Harriet’s
pivotal role in his intellectual journey, describing her as a ‘consummate artist’
(2007, p. 229). Accordingly, most commentators have taken Mill at his word, but in
the view of Alexander Bain, Mill’s friend and first biographer, ‘he outraged all
reasonable credulity in describing her matchless genius, without being able to supply
corroborating evidence’ (Bain 1882, p. 171). As a result, Harriet’s contributions have
not, until recently, been carefully studied on their own merits. Bruce Kinzer (2007)
has recently demonstrated that Harriet’s influence during the decade of the 1830s was
restricted to the development of Mill’s emotional side. Her intellectual influence
grew, to be sure, during the following two decades but, as argued by Reeves, many of
the revisions that Mill made to his seminal works owed much less to Harriet’s
thought than has commonly been perceived. Reeves indicates where there were clear
differences of opinion between them. He concludes that, ‘[w]hatever Mill said [in the
Autobiography], Harriet never directly dictated his views, but as two intelligent,
passionate people, they certainly debated them’ (2007, p. 230).
In this lucid, well-written and engaging biography of Britain’s greatest
nineteenth-century philosopher and public intellectual, Richard Reeves has
carefully and successfully interlaced Mill’s personal story with his intellectual ideas
and engagements to produce a coherent and rounded portrait of an immensely
important Victorian personality. In an account that will appeal to both the dilettante
and serious scholar alike, Mill is portrayed as an ardent partisan and talented
polemicist who in life relentlessly pursued those personal crochets and causes that
were considered vital in projecting his vision of an open, tolerant liberal culture
founded on individual initiative. In short, Mill was a passionate firebrand in whose
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restless curiosity and energy the era’s momentous political and social
transformation was embodied. Mill’s story is the history of nineteenth-century
liberalism. He was its greatest champion, exponent and defender, often braving
derision for the things he did, said and wrote, particularly during the final decade of
his life. Yet, it is surely a measure of the stature of the man and the gravitas of his
intellectual arsenal that opinions on his place within the Victorian pantheon still
remain so decisively divided. For Reeves, Mill’s ‘legacy rests not only in the power
of his thought, however, but also in the inspiring conduct of his life―the finest
example of thought in action of the last two centuries … The world he left was
unquestionably better for his efforts. It still is’ (2007, p. 487).
________________________________
* School of Business, University of Notre Dame, Fremantle WA 6959. Email:
mdonoghue@nd.edu.au.
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Mark Donoghue*
The commemorative John Stuart Mill bicentennial conference held at University
College London in June 2006 has generated renewed interest in the life and work of
this notable Victorian personality. In this latest offering, Bruce Kinzer, the veteran
of several scholarly works focusing on various aspects of Mill’s political thought,
has presented his latest deliberations in a work that focuses on two important and
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overlapping subjects: the first group of chapters cover certain familiar biographical
themes relating strictly to Mill’s formative years while the latter half of the book
delves into various facets of Mill’s political thought and activities in relation to the
ebb and flow of Victorian political life. The overall result is a finely balanced group
of essays in which the author, with impressive nuance and lightness of touch,
probes into pertinent features of Mill’s intellectual biography.
Commentaries on the public and private lives of John Stuart Mill tend to rely
heavily upon his Autobiography. Kinzer’s latest work is no exception. However,
while Mill’s Autobiography remains a fountain of indispensable information on the
earlier phase of John Stuart Mill’s life story, it is not always a reliable source of
judgments about these years. As is well known, the Autobiography commences with
an account of the rigorous and unconventional childhood education Mill endured
under the ‘watchful eye’ of his authoritarian father, James Mill, a dour, humourless
Scot, who emerged during the early nineteenth century as the chief guardian of the
‘greatest happiness principle’. Kinzer strikes a convincing note in encapsulating the
overriding influence exercised by James Mill in the formation of his son’s moral
capacities, intellectual abilities and character. In a subtle account, Kinzer broadly
endorses the received view, as advanced most recently in the fine biography of
J. S. Mill by Nicholas Capaldi (2004), that James Mill ‘hampered his son’s
development of a coherent identity’ by imposing an educational regime that
favoured analysis and reason over imagination and feeling. As a young man, John
Stuart Mill came to the sudden realisation that the education imparted by his
imposing father had been deficient in its failure to cultivate those poetic and
romantic elements that he considered essential to developing a more rounded,
independent and happy personality. This realisation produced, in Stefan Collini’s
(1991, p. 122) words, ‘one of the best known identity-crises in history’. Much has
understandably been made of Mill’s account of his ‘mental crisis’ in the
Autobiography―the solitary reference to this pivotal episode―and the pervasive
part James Mill played in the sudden change in his son’s temperament. Kinzer
remains consistent and methodical as he evaluates James Mill’s faults and virtues
as father, thinker and teacher. He persuasively argues that Mill’s decision to
compose his Autobiography was motivated ‘in very considerable part by the need
to raise the ghost of his father, James Mill, and lay that ghost to rest’ (Kinzer 2007,
p. 9). Yet, Kinzer refrains from hypothesising that the relationship between father
and son ultimately disintegrated. In fact, John Stuart Mill’s own testimony toward
his father in the Autobiography remained generous without, of course, ever
descending into hagiography.
By the autumn of 1826, John Stuart Mill, now aware that the
apprenticeship that he had served under his father had passed its apogee, began to
embark upon a new transitional phase in his own intellectual and emotional
development. It took time for Mill to chisel out a new course of his own devising.
This did not mean that Mill had no further need for his father. For instance, the two
continued to work in close concert at the London headquarters of the East India
Company in Leadenhall Street. Here James Mill lent his eldest son considerable
assistance in relation to the practical day-to-day duties of the Examiner’s Office.
Likewise, the precocious son proved an invaluable ally in the defence of James
Mill’s Essay on Government, shoring it up against the withering attack that Thomas
Macaulay had launched upon the utilitarian logic of the elder Mill’s mode of
political reasoning. But, in other more pressing areas of his life, John Stuart Mill no
longer fell under the direct jurisdiction of his father. ‘The problem faced by the
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younger Mill in 1826’, as Kinzer (2007, p. 40) explains, ‘involved what to make of
what he had been given, and how to give himself the emotional nourishment his
father had failed to supply’. This undertaking, which involved an assertion of
independence that produced considerable personal anguish, ultimately led him into
the welcoming arms of Mrs Harriet Taylor, but not before he had found solace in
the romantic poetry of William Wordsworth and Samuel Coleridge, the philosophic
ideas of Continental thinkers such as Saint Simon, and the camaraderie of such
gifted contemporaries as John Sterling, William Eyton Tooke, Thomas Carlyle and
Henry Cole. Contemporaries paint a portrait of Mill as an attractive and likeable
young man with an easy-going demeanour and personable nature, a far cry from the
tortured soul that had fallen into a chasm of mental despair only a few years earlier.
For the first time in his life, Mill was surrounded by a close circle of friends who
valued him for his companionship and philosophic predisposition rather than his
intellectual pedigree.
The second half of the 1820s heralded the awakening of Mill’s poetic
voice and Kinzer provides an exhaustive account of Mill’s willingness to
investigate the fertile intellectual terrain left untrodden by his father. ‘Neither the
motive nor the content of John Mill’s program of internal culture could’, he says,
‘elicit James Mill’s understanding or support. Wordsworth, Coleridge, Sterling, the
Saint-Simonians―such men had nothing to say to James Mill, and he had nothing
to say to them’ (Kinzer 2007, p. 63). Nor was it long before Mill began to extend
the scope of his social and intellectual habitat to incorporate other like-minded
young radicals, several of whom straddled the Unitarian and Utilitarian movements
that were integral to London radicalism. By the early 1830s, Mill found himself
wrapped in the impassioned brace of the South Place circle, which was then
dominated by the other-worldly figure of William Johnson Fox whose Unitarian
congregation included various strains of political radicalism. Fox, a charismatic
Unitarian pastor well known for his then unorthodox views on marriage (such as
that it should be a union between equals), took it upon himself to introduce the
aspiring young intellectual, Mill, to the very chic and very married Harriet Taylor,
who was once described as possessing ‘a small head, a swan-like throat, and a
complexion like a pearl’ (quoted in Hayek 1951, p. 25). It is not certain why Fox
decided to introduce the two young people to each other. Perhaps he thought that
Mill’s enjoyable and stimulating company would raise her flagging spirits.
Whatever the reason might have been, Harriet Taylor and John Stuart Mill do seem
to have taken cultural pleasure in each other’s company: what began as a fledging
friendship gradually grew into a more intimate relationship that became the object
of lurid gossip within London’s polite middle-class circles. The speculation caused
an irrevocable rift between Mill and several close family members and friends who
endeavoured to counsel him, explaining that his ill-judged dalliance had violated
the canons of upright conduct. The intensity and complexity of the relationship
between Mill and Taylor placed a considerable strain on Harriet and John Taylor’s
marriage. The resolution contrived by Harriet, known for exerting ‘an authoritarian
influence over the emotional lives of those with whom she was intimate’ (Kinzer
2007, p. 110), was an awkward triangular compact that permitted Mill to visit Harriet
at her Regent’s Park residence when John Taylor was absent and to be seen in public
with her on carefully chosen occasions. Kinzer explains that, despite such seemingly
intractable problems, Mill was prepared to tolerate the highly unusual arrangement
because he had succumbed to Harriet’s ‘emotional aggressiveness’ (Kinzer 2007, p.
100) in order to cultivate those aesthetic faculties that would permit him to jettison
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what remained of his father’s initial influence. It is unlikely that Harriet found the
peculiar domestic situation that she had carefully constructed as intolerable as her
young suitor, for she possessed ‘a prodigious emotional resilience and a crafty selffashioning’ that carried her ‘through the thickets’ (Kinzer 2007, p. 110).
There is now a considerable body of scholarship which ascribes a central
place to Harriet Taylor in shaping Mill’s emotional and intellectual development
(see, for example, Hayek 1951; Stillinger 1983; Rose 1984; Mendus 1994; Jacobs
2002). Kinzer challenges the veracity of this interpretation. He argues thus: ‘Harriet
Taylor’s influence on his emotional life during the 1830s did not spill over into the
intellectual and political spheres’ (Kinzer 2007, p. 110). He continues: ‘When she
[Harriet] declared that she knew things of which he was ignorant, she was making
no claim for her superior learnedness or intellectual acuity, but rather for her
surpassing insight into matters involving “human feeling and character”’ (ibid.). In
fact, Mill acknowledged as much in the Autobiography when he wrote: ‘The poetic
elements of her [Harriet’s] character, which were at that time the most ripened,
were naturally those which impressed me first, and those years were, in respect of
my own development, mainly years of poetic culture’ (Mill 1981, p. 198). Although
Kinzer’s account of Harriet’s influence on Mill is limited to the 1830s, it
nevertheless leaves the reader with a far better narrative concerning the astonishing
drama of Mill’s aesthetic development than has hitherto been detailed. Still, it is a
shame that Kinzer’s account of Harriet’s influence over the direction of Mill’s
intellectual progress, one of the most contested issues in Mill scholarship,
deliberately omits any examination of her impact during the 1840s and 1850s when
the depth of their intellectual and emotional bond grew stronger.
The second set of chapters in this volume deal with Mill’s political leanings
from the early 1830s until the late 1860s. The fusion of biographical and political
elements throws invaluable light on Mill as political radical, public intellectual and
champion of ‘advanced liberal’ causes, carefully chronicling the role as an outsider, a
role in which Mill deliberately cast himself from the outset of his public career.
During the years in which Mill began to absorb the ‘poetic culture’ of
Harriet Taylor, the romantic writers and Continental philosophers, he also made a
conscious decision to establish a reputation for himself as a radical political
commentator. Mill’s preparation of fugitive pieces of political journalism soon won
for him a reputation for political activism. His tirades against the political
establishment then dominated by the aristocratic landed gentry, whether they be
Whig or Tory, were intended to demonstrate the provincialism and poverty of
English political life as against the fluidity and fecundity of France’s political
landscape. Mill excelled at this sort of forensic political narrative but these
indulgences seem to have tarnished his posthumous reputation. While his admirers
cherished his every syllable, Mill’s detractors neither forgot nor forgave him.
Kinzer emphasises here that the emergence of Mill as an independent political
commentator capable of influencing English public opinion could only be achieved
following, first, the decisive intellectual and emotional break from his father and,
second, the gradual realisation that he had reached the point in his own intellectual
and emotional journey where he was capable of shaping and managing his own
thoughts and affairs. The yoking of these two themes allows a more nuanced view
of Mill to emerge that lays emphasis upon his capacity for personal and intellectual
growth following his much commented upon mental trauma.
An important early example of Mill’s distinctive political radicalism was
his advocacy of secret voting as an important control mechanism accompanying the
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passing of the 1832 Reform Act. During the 1830s, Mill believed that the political
activities of the two dominant parties―the Whigs and Tories―served landed
interests and preserved the political privileges of the aristocracy at the expense of
the body politic. Electoral intimidation and bribery, Mill believed, remained
widespread and so underpinned the political dominance of aristocratic interests. By
the 1850s, however, Mill had become a fervent opponent of the ballot because he
believed that the Reform Act had so altered the social and political condition of
England in the intervening twenty years that secret voting was neither necessary
nor desirable. Kinzer, who published his own views on the matter in an article in
Historical Reflections some years ago (see Kinzer 1978), has performed an
admirable task in unravelling the shifting contours of Mill’s position on the ballot
question. Mill’s changing position on the ballot underscores that sense of his own
intellectual and political independence as well as highlighting the more mature
reflections of a political philosopher and public moralist (as opposed to those of a
young radical propagandist). As Kinzer (2007, p. 156) remarks: ‘Mill owed no
debts to any party or group, and the authority he possessed stemmed from his
remarkable achievements as a philosopher and political economist’. What is
surprising here is that this and related topics have not received anything like close
attention from Mill scholars in the intervening period, an indication of the fact that
Mill scholarship today is dominated by philosophers rather than historians,
economists or political scientists.
In addition to the ballot question, Mill was remarkably well informed
about a host of other political issues that impacted upon English (and French)
society. Indeed, many advanced liberals and prominent radicals looked to Mill for
intellectual and political guidance during the mid-Victorian era. After all, Mill
enjoyed the ‘ear of England’ and never hesitated to bend it in order to influence the
direction of national debate on topical issues of the day. Nowhere was this more
obvious than during the final fifteen years of his life ‘where he revealed himself to
be avowedly partisan and, when roused to a pitch of moral outrage, violently
polemical’ (Collini 1991, p. 121). The sense of independence to which Mill aspired
in his personal and professional lives found expression in his strictures on the role
of party politics in British political life during the mid-Victorian period. Kinzer
(2007, p. 165) carefully explains that Mill eschewed the advances of Whigs and
Tories alike because both parties were wedded to the preservation of aristocratic
privilege and remained committed to the formation of a genuine radical party
‘dedicated to the extinction of aristocratic government and the democratization of
British institutions and society’. The evolution of Britain’s political institutions
coupled with the extension of the political franchise to cover all adult working men
and women would, Mill believed, greatly enhance the effectiveness of the electoral
system. Yet Mill remained ambivalent as to the ability of a Westminster
parliamentary democracy to deliver decisive ‘improvements to mankind’. His own
personal commitment to the political process spurned narrow party lines, even
though he was voted into Parliament in 1865 as one of Westminster’s two liberal
MPs. He remained supportive of a Liberal Ministry in the House of Commons,
although he himself insisted during campaign hustings that his duty was to
represent his electorate as an ‘independent’ liberal candidate. A common refrain in
Mill’s mature political writings was that the ‘existing electoral system, dominated
by petty party interests and local political networks, prevented men of ability and
independent mind from obtaining seats in the House of Commons’ (Kinzer 2007,
p. 196). Mill aimed to act in the best interests of his electorate regardless of the
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pressures that might be exerted from within his own party. His own well-known
intransigence on such grave issues as the reform of the Irish land system and the
campaign to prosecute Governor Eyre brought him into direct conflict with
members on both sides of the House of Commons. Mill, the champion of minority
or ‘dissentient opinions’, nonetheless remained intransigent, steadfastly refusing
either to moderate his political template or tone down his rhetoric, even though
these were very often self-defeating, exaggerated and intemperate. During his final
decade, Mill’s conduct both inside and outside the parliamentary arena reinforced
his commitment to a new political order that sought to elevate the material and
moral condition of the people without, however, sacrificing the higher ideals of
character, independence and individual liberty. In his Autobiography Mill wrote:
‘The same idea, that the use of my being in Parliament was to do work which others
were not able or not willing to do, made me think it my duty to come to the front in
defence of advanced Liberalism on occasions when the obloquy to be encountered
was such as most of the advanced Liberals in the House, preferred not to incur’
(Mill 1981, p. 276).
Overall, Professor Kinzer’s thoughtful collection of essays is a timely
reminder of the versatility, power and perspicacity of John Stuart Mill’s
penmanship on a range of ‘advanced liberal’ topics that defined the Victorian era.
Mill’s liberal reform agenda remains particularly vital in an age where the voice of
the public intellectual has been eclipsed and the centre of public culture remains
firmly moored to popular fashions and fetishes, arid journalism, mass marketing
and puerile gimmicks, all masquerading as critical commentary on key public
policy issues. It can only be hoped that the weightier, more cultivated prose as
enunciated by the Saint of Rationalism (as William Gladstone affectionately
dubbed Mill) never completely fades away. The fate of public culture depends on it.
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Claude Gnos and Louis-Philippe Rochon (eds). The Keynesian Multiplier.
London and New York: Routledge. 2008. Pp. xvii + 202. ISBN 978-0-41532013-9 (hb). US$130.

J. E. King*
This is a rather strange book. Only one of the ten chapters is ‘pure’ history of
economic thought. This is by Luca Fiorito, who draws on archival sources to
establish John Maurice Clark’s contribution to the genesis of the multiplier concept
(chapter 2). Two other contributions, by Heinrich Bortis, on the multiplier in the
Keynesian tradition (chapter 3), and by Malcolm Sawyer on Michał Kalecki and the
multiplier (chapter 8), also have a substantial history of economic thought content.
Both are very good, as might be expected. Bortis, in particular, writes cogently on
the respective versions of the multiplier found in Richard Kahn, Michal Kalecki,
Nicholas Kaldor and Evsey Domar, with some additional very interesting material
on the ‘super-multiplier’ and on the origins of the multiplier analysis in the work of
the Physiocrats and Karl Marx. He might perhaps have cited Andrew Trigg’s recent
book on this aspect of the problem (Trigg 2006).
The remaining seven chapters are more or less analytical in nature, and
most of them fall within the ‘monetary circuit’ branch of Post Keynesian
endogenous money theory. However, they come to very different conclusions
concerning the validity of the multiplier analysis. Thus in chapter 1 Jochen Hartwig
argues that neither the ‘logical’ (that is, static) nor the ‘dynamic view’ of the
multiplier is defensible. Instead, the multiplier can only be interpreted ‘as an
equilibrium proportion [between] two departments within a reproduction scheme’
(p. 26). Xavier Bradley (chapter 4) regards the whole idea of the multiplier as
‘based on the confusion, in the same operation, of the formation and the spending
of incomes’ (p. 87). For Alain Parguez (chapter 5), the ‘multiplier theory … is
false. It contradicts the very nature of money’ (p. 116). Basil Moore (chapter 6) is
equally sceptical, but for different reasons. He regards Keynes’ multiplier analysis
as ‘mistaken’ (p. 121), since complex non-linear systems have no closed-form
solution, as the multiplier relationship requires. In chapter 7 Jean-Luc Bailly
concludes that ‘there is no dynamic multiplier of a value other than unity’ (p. 148).
I doubt whether either Bortis or Sawyer would agree with any of these
criticisms. To add to the reader’s confusion, the two final chapters, which are
written separately by the editors, reveal a much more favourable position on the
coherence of the multiplier analysis. Thus Louis-Philippe Rochon (chapter 9)
concludes that ‘the multiplier depends on the banking system … [and] is not an
automatic phenomenon. It can hold, provided initial injections into the circuit lead
to increased private revenues sufficient to guarantee the renewal [of] debt
commitment and the extension of bank credit to renew production’ (p. 177). This,
of course, is more or less what Keynes himself concluded, when writing of the
‘factors which it is most important not to overlook’ in discussions of the multiplier.
The first of these was the danger that:
The method of financing the policy and the increased working
cash, required by the increased employment and the associated
rise of prices, may have the effect of increasing the rate of
interest and so reducing investment in other directions, unless
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the monetary authority takes steps to the contrary … (Keynes
1936, p. 119)
Finally, Claude Gnos suggests that ‘endogenous money does not run counter to
Keynes’s original conception of the multiplier but only to the standard
interpretation of it’ (p. 191). Returning to Jochen Hartwig’s distinction between the
logical and dynamic notions of the multiplier, Gnos comes down on the side of the
former:
The multiplier is, in fact, static or logical. It can, however, be
combined with the dynamics of the economy resulting from
behaviour patterns, through the principle of effective demand
by which entrepreneurs decide on the scale of their production
with regard to their expected proceeds from sales, which of
course may be influenced by an increase in investment. (p. 191)
Precisely how this statement can be reconciled with the much more critical
approach taken by no fewer than five of his contributors, Gnos does not say.
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David A. Spencer. The Political Economy of Work. London and New York:
Routledge. 2009. Pp. xix + 170. ISBN 978-0-415-45793-4 (hb). US$130.

J. E. King*
I wish I had written this book. David Spencer has produced a scholarly, lucidly
written and totally convincing analysis of the treatment of work in the history of
economic thought, from the early Mercantilists right down to the present day. It is a
marvellous achievement.
Spencer’s basic thesis is simple and, I think, entirely correct:
Work can be characterised as merely a means of earning a living.
However, it can also be viewed as a potential source of personal
achievement and self-fulfilment … work can be something
more than a mere means, so long as it is organised in a manner
that accords with the interests of workers … the human ideal is
not a life of freedom from work. (p. 3)
In six short but incisive chapters Spencer traces the way in which work has been
treated in the literature of economics, from the seventeenth- and early eighteenthcentury proponents of low wages as a means of keeping the poor out of idleness to
twenty-first-century studies of the economics of happiness. He deals successively
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with concepts of work in pre-classical and classical political economy; the prowork sentiments of late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century authors, including
William Godwin, Thomas Carlyle, John Ruskin and William Morris; the Marxian
view of work, with which he broadly sympathises; neoclassical and Austrian
attitudes to work at the end of the nineteenth century; the contributions of the
American institutionalists; and ‘the hidden abode of production’ in modern
mainstream economics.
Apart from Marx, Spencer’s heroes include John Stuart Mill, John Ruskin,
William Morris, John R. Commons and J. A. Hobson, as might be expected, but
also William Stanley Jevons and Alfred Marshall. Jevons was prepared to see work
as a potential source of both pain and pleasure, while Marshall echoed Mill (and
Ruskin, and Marx) in regarding work as an essential part of life rather than as a
mere means of obtaining consumer goods. Unlike Marx, of course, Marshall
believed that capitalism could be reformed to reduce drudgery and greatly improve
the quality of work for all. Spencer is also favourably impressed by the
institutionalists, especially Commons and Hobson. His verdict on Thorstein Veblen
is mixed. While praising Veblen’s critique of ‘pecuniary [that is, capitalist] culture’
as invariably hostile to the ‘instinct of workmanship’, Spencer criticises both his
support of Taylorism and his tendency to underestimate the impact of capitalist
machine production on the autonomy and skill of the worker. With the exception of
Hobson, who was genuinely transatlantic, these institutionalists were all American.
As Spencer notes, (p. 148 n.13), the history of non-neoclassical labour economics
in Britain has yet to be written (his next book, possibly?).
Among the villains, the Austrians occupy pride of place. By insisting on
expunging any notion of ‘real cost’ from their theory of value, Carl Menger and his
followers were responsible for a fatal shift in mainstream theory, from the marginal
disutility of labour (which could in principle be positive or negative) to the
opportunity cost of work time, viewed only as leisure foregone (which could only
be positive). In consequence, consumption rather than work moved to the centre of
marginalist economic theory. These errors, Spencer argues, were carried over into
the virulently neoclassical version of labour economics that burst out of Chicago in
the late 1950s and all but eradicated the institutionalist approach to the economics
of work. They also vitiated Oliver Williamson’s new institutional economics and
the later personnel economics of Edward Lazear and his acolytes. Neither
‘shirking’, nor opportunism, nor principal-agent theory, nor efficiency wage models
of the labour market escape Spencer’s critical attention. The book concludes with a
scathing attack on the most recent literature on the economics of happiness, which
he criticises for ignoring both the phenomenon of alienation and the notion that
satisfying work might be a basic human need, whether or not it is experienced (and
articulated) as such.
There is a great deal to think about on almost every page of this short
book. My only real criticism is that it is, perhaps, too short. Two or three extra
chapters might have been included, for example on the thinking of socialist
exponents of ‘the right to be lazy’ (the title of a pamphlet by Marx’s son-in-law
Paul Lafargue), which included writers as diverse as Bertrand Russell and André
Gorz. He might have devoted a chapter to the treatment of work in the industrial
sociology and industrial psychology literature, to contrast it with the impoverished
analysis of the mainstream economists. There are brief references to Taylorism, as
already noted, and also to Abraham Maslow, but a broader discussion taking in
Frederick Herzberg and also Elton Mayo and the human relations tradition would
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have been useful. Work is a social activity, and the creation of occupational
communities is one of its most important consequences, often helping to cement the
ideological power of employers and thereby to frustrate union efforts to improve
the quality of work itself (see Richards 2008 for a recent case study). Finally, the
rather truncated discussion of the Marxian ‘labour process’ literature could have
been expanded; there is no mention of the seminal work of Andrew Friedman
(1977), for example.
But these are minor points, which in no way detract from Spencer’s
achievement. This book will become a classic.
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Roger Frantz (ed.). Renaissance in Behavioral Economics: Essays in Honor
of Harvey Leibenstein. London & New York: Routledge. 2007. ISBN 978-0415-70080-1 (hb). Pp. 234. £65.

John Lodewijks*
This is a collection of chapters of mixed quality written by authors trying to come
to grips with Leibenstein’s contributions to economics. He is generally regarded,
along with Herbert Simon and George Katona, as among the first generation of
behavioural economists. Yet it is also recognised that Leibenstein’s ideas are
largely absent from modern behavioural economics.
There seems to be some ambivalence about how his contributions are to be
classified. For example, Peter Earl, while including him in his 1988 Behavioral
Economics collection for Elgar, suggests that he may belong in a ‘pseudobehaviouralist group’. Pseudo-behaviouralists are ‘scholars whose inclinations are
really (or normally seem to be) those of the orthodox, marginalist neoclassical
economist’. Frantz tells us that Leibenstein insisted he was a neoclassical
economist, but one that did not believe that human behaviour was always
maximising (p. 10). Jason Potts, however, tells us that Leibenstein’s X-efficiency
concept is ‘logically meaningless in a strictly neoclassical framework’ (p. 96).
I can personally identify with this confusion. As a student I was easily won
over by the attractiveness of X-efficiency analysis and it seemed like an obvious
recognition that human effort is at all times variable. It was an empirically
grounded approach that seemed to make sense, particularly in the developing
world. However, when I got to graduate school E. R. Weintraub was quick to let
students know that Leibenstein was quite ‘mad’ and what he was saying was
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logically incomprehensible. Craig Freedman has entertained us over the years with
his treatment of Stigler, who staged a bitter attack on Leibenstein’s work. Potts’
take on this, and his articles are always interesting, is that Leibenstein ‘was not so
much a mad uncle in the Harvard faculty’s attic … but rather a brilliant
evolutionary economist struggling to escape’. Moreover, X-efficiency ‘only makes
consistent analytical sense in an evolutionary and complex systems theory-based
evolutionary framework’ (p. 92).
What this volume illustrates is the various ways that Leibenstein made a
lasting contribution to economics. We all know about X-efficiency. Roger Frantz,
in the concluding chapter, notes that from the late 1960s through to 2002
approximately 80 journal articles were published trying to estimate the size of Xinefficiency and these studies consistently showed support for its existence across
numerous industries and countries. The term itself was heavily cited in the Social
Science Citation Index, reaching a peak in 1981–85 (pp. 212-13). What is less
known are his contributions in other areas of economics. This covers his pioneering
work on efficiency wages (later developed by Akerlof) discussed by Morris
Altman, Leibenstein’s link between entrepreneurship and economic development
discussed by Hamid Hosseini, and his work on consumption discussed by Paul
Albanese.
Leibenstein’s treatment of status goods follows Duesenberry’s work on
interdependence of preferences and Veblen’s earlier notions of emulation and
conspicuous consumption. Peter Earl, in his chapter, applies the concept of Xefficiency to consumption decisions rather than to firm behaviour to explore why
consumers make poor choices or have pathological tendencies to consume the
wrong products. Readers of this journal can easily relate to this perspective but may
have trouble when it broaches other disciplines. Paul Zak relates Leibenstein’s
work to developments in ‘neuroeconomics’ using neuroscience to understand how
people make economic decisions. Gerald Cory also draws on findings in
evolutionary neuroscience or brain psychology and concludes that Leibenstein ‘was
not only a key figure in the founding of behavioural economics, but his concepts
were also prescient of findings in brain psychology or neural architecture’ (p. 34).
Readers may have difficulty penetrating the jargon in this literature, for example,
from p. 54:
We can redefine rationality, not as a maximization or not of
self-interest, but as a cognitively-mediated and appropriate
dynamic balancing of our self-preserving and affectional
circuitries―the integrated expression of our social exchange
neural architecture as situationally and circumstantially
appropriate.
This volume has its failings. The editor’s introduction repeats much of the
concluding chapter. Some chapters are overly long while others do not seem to add
much to our understanding of this person. However, there is enough evidence here
to be somewhat sympathetic to Altman’s claim that ‘Leibenstein contributed to and
set the foundations for some of the most innovative advancements of twentieth
century economics’ (p. 141).
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Geoffrey Poitras (ed.). Pioneers of Financial Economics. Volume 2:
Twentieth-Century Contributions. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 2007.
Pp. 256. ISBN 978 1 8542 3827 (hb). £75.

Jan Toporowski*
Contemporary financial economics, like alchemy, is a calculating pre-science. It
aspires to scientific status, but fails to achieve it because financial economics is
driven by a search for its own philosopher’s stone, and its theorists are distracted by
the pursuit of red herrings. The philosopher’s stone of finance is a method to
forecast stock prices or, what amounts to the same thing, a way of speculating
risklessly. This volume is concerned with the twentieth-century ‘discoveries’ of
Harry Markowitz, Robert Merton, Merton Miller, Fischer Black, Myron Scholes
and other legends of academic finance who converted ‘a collection of anecdotes,
rules of thumb, and manipulations of accounting data’ into ‘a rigorous economic
theory subjected to scientific empirical examination’ (Merton 1992, pp. xii-xiv,
cited more than once in the volume under review). By a process of restricting the
arguments until a determinate algorithm for forecasting stock prices, or
determining risk, emerges, modern quantitative finance offers the philosopher’s
stone, but substitutes for it ‘optimal’, ‘risk-adjusted’ portfolios that are only
optimal or risk-adjusted in such a limited sense as to be impractical. Since only a
saint or a subversive would ever settle for anything less than an optimal or riskadjusted portfolio of wealth, the prospectus for quantitative finance inevitably
wins out over more modest and more practical approaches. Our heroes secured
valuable Wall Street consultancies. But they were employed largely for marketing
purposes and were rarely allowed to influence actual investment practice and
strategy.
Moreover, contrary to Merton’s self-serving assertion, not all of the
alternative approaches to finance are mere anecdotes, rules of thumb, or
manipulations of accounting data. As Paul Davidson argues persuasively in the
paper that concludes this volume, the work of John Maynard Keynes, and we may
add his followers such as Hyman Minsky, was much more systematic and does not
require such unreal assumptions about banking and financial markets. However,
from the point of view of the ‘finance discipline’, Keynesian, Minskyan, and other
such theories are handicapped in the market for academic and professional ideas by
their positive realism rather than the norms that they offer for successful
speculation. (I would like to think that this is the reason why Paul Davidson and I
are not on Wall Street payrolls.) Despite Merton’s puff about ‘scientific empirical
examination’, modern finance is normative in purpose and assumption, and has
been interpreted as such by fund managers in its main markets in the US and UK.
Markowitz’ portfolio theory was the first major red herring, postulating a
universal calculus to obtain optimally diversified portfolios with spreads of returns
depending upon the extent to which investors were willing to hold risky assets. It
was but a small step to impose a determinate frequency distribution for future
returns and divide those returns into a market average and a stock-specific return.
Thus was born the Capital Asset Pricing Model that is the staple of the modern
finance textbook.
But the red herring that drew most academic hounds and spawned the most
important subsequent red herrings was the Modigliani–Miller ‘theorem’. Most
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readers of finance textbooks know this as ‘proving’ that the value of a company is
independent of its financing. In fact, the theory shows that in a state of perfect
competition and knowledge of future returns, financing does not affect the value of
a company. Merton Miller’s especial contribution to the theorem was not only the
observation that there was a wide dispersion of financing among American
companies, but also a very convenient definition of equilibrium in which no further
arbitrage was possible. The theorem was most widely interpreted as demonstrating
that any non-random distribution of financing among companies must be due to
departures from the initial restrictive assumptions about perfect competition,
knowledge and so on. This set finance and economics off on a hunt for ‘market
imperfections’ that may account for non-random financing.
An immediate consequence of this line of reasoning was that corporate
finance, or the study of how companies actually finance their activities, and the
effects of that financing on their activities, disappeared from the discussion.
Furthermore, with the assumption of ‘no arbitrage’, the investigation of actual
financial market processes was reduced to connecting prices to ‘information’. All
that was now necessary to understand markets was time series analysis of price
data. Far from extending the boundaries of our knowledge, finance was now
excluding key aspects of financial activity from the scope of its analysis.
The search for ‘market imperfections’ led to other theoretical innovations
that further narrowed the ‘scientific’ and policy discourse of finance. Predictably
Chicago identified taxation and market regulation as the culprits in financial market
inefficiency. In response, Joseph Stiglitz at MIT offered information asymmetries
as causing financial market imperfections. At Yale, Robert Shiller offered
behavioural finance (not mentioned in this volume), and the failure of investors to
calculate optimally, as explanations of market inefficiency. By the end of the
twentieth century, the key expenditure decisions of firms that determine the
dynamics of market economies, and the crucial influence of financing conditions
upon those decisions, had been dropped off the agenda of academic finance. Their
residual trace on that agenda was Tobin’s ‘q’ theory, relating the cost of investment
to the cost of capital. But this was hardly seminal and, in its general equilibrium
form, is relatively trivial.
The first part of this book discusses some of the theories pre-dating the
quantitative revolution. Here Morgen Witzel examines the financial management
ideas of Jeremiah Jenks, Edward Meade and William Ripley; Geoffrey Poitras
introduces us to the ideas of Frederick Macaulay and Frank Redington; and Gabriel
Hawawini and Ashok Vora discuss how the calculation of yields evolved from the
seventeenth century onwards. In this part too, Robert Dimand contributes an excellent
survey of Irving Fisher’s contributions to finance theory, curiously omitting Fisher’s
debt deflation theory. However, for reasons not made clear, Keynes’ analysis is
absent from this part of the volume. Keynes is discussed separately at the end of the
volume in Davidson’s contribution. This is possibly more logical, because Davidson
engages so extensively and enthusiastically in polemics against the general
equilibrium foundations of quantitative finance theory. Keynes’ appearance as an
afterthought like this may also be connected with the concentration in this volume, in
contrast to volume 1, on developments in American finance theory.
Among the papers published here, ‘The history of quantitative risk
measurement’ by Elton McGoun invites special mention because of its scholarly
explanation of how, in the course of the quantitative revolution, uncertainty became
conflated with calculable risk, and that calculable risk was then restricted to
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tractable frequency distributions into which historical price data could be more
easily fitted. The ‘results’ of analysis came to dominate realism: ‘… anything that
is “extremely difficult” is “avoided” as “hardly affecting the results”’ (p. 207).
McGoun provides a clear account of how, under such a regime of ‘theoretical
rigour’, redefining terms allowed financial economists to persuade themselves that
they were calculating the incalculable.
In the final analysis it is not possible to see where finance went wrong, or
how it was reduced to providing sedative comfort for practitioners facing the
usual unprecedented uncertainty in the financial markets (see Toporowski 2002),
without an overview of the history of the discipline, such as this volume and its
companion, provide. In any discipline, individual papers and works invite
criticism of their assumptions and/or their theoretical or methodological
consistency. Only a survey of their history can give a clear indication of where an
applied discipline such as finance has taken a wrong direction, or disengaged
from the issues of our time, and the consequences of that disengagement. This is
the main achievement of this volume and its editor Geoffrey Poitras (with
assistance from Franck Jovanovic).
My only overall reservation about this book is that it tends to accept the
Merton line that the emergence of quantitative finance has been a purely academic
process of ‘discovery’. This is very apparent in the middle part of this volume
entitled ‘The Modern Finance Revolution: The Inside Perspective’, and in the final
part entitled ‘Alternative Perspectives on the Revolution’. In the first of these
sections Hal Varian, Rene Stultz, Robert Jarrow, Robert Merton and Myron
Scholes pay glowing tributes to the intellectual profundity and originality of
Markowitz, Miller, Merton, Sharpe, Black and Scholes. In the third and final part,
Franck Jovanovic, Donald MacKenzie, Elton McGoun, and Paul Davidson question
the assumptions that underlie quantitative finance. This presents finance as an
academic hermeneutic, finding and criticising scholarly antecedents, and thrilling at
or belittling originality. But behind these discussions was the depression into which
the stock of investment bankers had fallen in the 1930s (see Sweezy 1941), and the
recovery in that stock with the process of inflation in the US financial markets from
the 1970s onwards, to the point where it is now impossible to read John Kenneth
Galbraith’s classic, The Great Crash, sensibly without choking on déjà vu at the
chapter entitled ‘In Goldman Sachs We Trust’.
The emergence of quantitative finance was associated with the rise to
financial market pre-eminence of fund managers deploying huge investments in
increasingly unstable securities markets. The previous system of stabilising
portfolios by holding government securities was losing its effectiveness, with the
repayment of War debts, large capital issues by corporations, and a corresponding
need to rebalance portfolios in favour of private sector liabilities. The theoretical
innovations of Markowitz et al. offered a rationale for convincing fund managers
that their portfolios were just as safe even as they were getting more risky. This
background, mentioned only in passing in the editor’s introduction, would naturally
suggest a consideration of the macroeconomic consequences of finance, and the
apparent inability of financial economists to see beyond their price data analyses.
However, since this volume was published when the current liquidity drain in the
markets was a mere gurgle in the upper intestine of Wall Street, it is, perhaps,
easier to overlook the absence of this consideration. Nevertheless it is the outcome
of that financial inflation, and the abject failure of economists to provide a
systematic account of it, that make this book so timely. Until economists and
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policymakers emancipate themselves from mainstream finance theory, we cannot
improve our failing financial system nor even start to create a scientific discipline
of finance.
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